Resilience
What is business continuity?
Business continuity is an organisation's capability to continue delivering its critical activities during and after a disruptive incident. In practice it consists of a documented plan, based on an analysis of which functions matter most and how long they can be unavailable, that sets recovery objectives and defines the arrangements, roles and alternatives needed to meet them.
At a glance
- RTO
- Recovery Time Objective — how quickly a function must be restored
- RPO
- Recovery Point Objective — how much data loss is tolerable
- Foundation document
- Business impact analysis (BIA)
- Standard
- ISO 22301
- Critical practice
- Regular testing — untested plans routinely fail
RTO and RPO
Two measures drive most continuity decisions. Recovery Time Objective is the maximum acceptable period a function can be unavailable before consequences become unacceptable. Recovery Point Objective is the maximum acceptable amount of data loss, expressed as time — an RPO of four hours means backups must be taken at least every four hours.
Both are business decisions rather than technical ones, and both drive cost. Tight objectives require replication, standby infrastructure and more frequent backup; they are worth paying for on genuinely critical systems and rarely worth paying for across the whole estate. Setting them function by function is what keeps continuity affordable.
What a plan contains
A usable continuity plan is short, specific and accessible without the systems it protects.
- A business impact analysis identifying critical functions, their dependencies and their tolerable downtime.
- Named roles and deputies, with decision-making authority stated explicitly.
- Contact details for staff, key suppliers, insurers, the bank and technical responders — held offline.
- Recovery procedures for each critical system, with RTO and RPO stated.
- Manual workarounds for operating while systems are unavailable.
- Internal and external communication templates, including customer and regulator notification.
- A testing schedule and a record of previous test outcomes.
Continuity, disaster recovery and cyber incidents
Disaster recovery is the technical subset concerned with restoring IT systems and data. Business continuity is broader: it covers how the organisation keeps trading — including manually — while that restoration happens.
Cyber incidents complicate both. Unlike a flood or power failure, a ransomware attack may have compromised the recovery environment itself, may require systems to stay offline for forensic investigation, and brings regulatory notification obligations. Continuity plans written only for physical disruption often fail their first cyber test for exactly these reasons.
Sources
The definitions and figures on this page are drawn from the primary sources below. Where guidance changes, the source takes precedence over our summary of it.
- Business continuity and disaster recovery planning — National Cyber Security Centre
- Offline backups in an online world — National Cyber Security Centre
- Guide to the UK GDPR: Security — Information Commissioner's Office
FAQ
What is business continuity — common questions
Direct answers to the questions asked most often about this topic.
What is the difference between business continuity and disaster recovery?
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Disaster recovery is the technical process of restoring IT systems, data and infrastructure after an incident — restoring servers, recovering databases, rebuilding endpoints. Business continuity is the wider discipline of keeping the organisation functioning throughout, which includes disaster recovery but also manual workarounds, staff and premises arrangements, supplier dependencies, customer communication and decision-making authority. An organisation can have excellent disaster recovery and still fail commercially if nobody knows how to take orders, pay staff or answer customers during the days it takes to restore.
How often should a continuity plan be tested?
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At least annually, and after any significant change to systems, premises, key suppliers or personnel. Testing does not have to mean a full failover exercise. A tabletop walkthrough — talking a realistic scenario through with the people who would actually respond — surfaces most weaknesses at very low cost, typically finding that contact lists are out of date, the plan is stored only on the system that would be encrypted, or a named responder left the organisation. Technical restore testing should be more frequent, ideally quarterly, since backup jobs that report success frequently fail to restore.
What should the RTO be for a small business?
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It depends on the function, not the organisation. Email and telephony often have short tolerances, since customer contact stops without them. Accounting systems may tolerate a day or two outside period-end but very little during it. Archived records may tolerate a week. Setting a single organisation-wide RTO usually produces either unaffordable infrastructure or unrealistic promises. The practical method is to list critical functions, ask what actually happens after four hours, one day and three days of unavailability, and set objectives where consequences become genuinely damaging.
Do small businesses really need a written continuity plan?
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Small organisations are more exposed to disruption, not less, because they have fewer staff who know how each process works and thinner cash reserves to absorb downtime. The plan does not need to be lengthy — a handful of pages covering critical functions, recovery steps, offline contact details and manual workarounds is far more useful than an unread fifty-page document. Written form matters because incidents happen when the person who understands the system is on holiday, unreachable or dealing with something else. Clients, insurers and tender processes also increasingly ask to see one.
Where should the continuity plan be stored?
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In at least one place that does not depend on the systems it protects. A plan stored solely on a network share or in the Microsoft 365 tenant is inaccessible during exactly the incident it was written for — ransomware encrypting file servers, or a tenant compromise requiring accounts to be locked. Practical arrangements include printed copies held by key personnel, an encrypted copy on a personal device, or storage with a separate provider using different credentials. Contact details in particular should be available without access to corporate email or the phone system.

